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Waziristan is sliding into a larger war Published on April 01, 2006
Waziristan, a tribal region of 11,585 square kilometers in the northwest of Pakistan, is historically known as the land that cannot easily be conquered or subjugated. Its extremely mountainous terrain helped it successfully resist all invaders, including the Mughal, Sikh, and British armies. A more important factor, however, has been its conservative tribal inhabitants, who are traditionally known for being supreme fighters, proud of their Islamic faith and Pathan descent and fiercely concerned about their independence. Having realized this, the British colonial authority let Waziristan became an independent territory outside the bounds of effective British rule when the Durand Line was established as the border between Afghanistan and British India in 1893. Similarly, Pakistan�s founding father Mohammed Ali Jinnah did not insist on fully controlling the region at the time of the creation of Pakistan in 1947, leaving it to retain its traditional autonomy. But Jinnah was the first to exploit the fighting talent and religious zeal of Waziristan�s tribesmen, when he incited them to lead Pakistan�s first war in Kashmir in 1947-48. This was repeated in the 1980s by the country�s military dictator General Zia-ul-Haque, who used them as cannon fodder during the Afghan War. Successive Pakistani governments have chosen to continue this practice of pacification while establishing influence through compromise with and payment of subsidies to tribal chieftains. The latter, in their turn, have shown cooperation with Islamabad, but have also managed to extort it with the aim of increasing their financial muscle. The remnants of Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, of course, were fully aware of all this when they chose Waziristan to be their hideout after the Americans pushed them out of Afghanistan in 2001. In Waziristan, they would not only ensure an isolated and remote shelter, but would also enjoy widespread popular support and many other advantages that could be employed in rebuilding their forces, planning and launching terrorist activities across the border, and consequently causing a headache for the Kabul government and US-led coalition forces. In addition to its location on the Afghanistan border, financial muscle resulted from trading in drugs, and a large pool of weapons left over from the time of Jihad against the Soviets, Waziristan has been hosting tens of thousands of Afghan refugees since the 1980s. Washington soon realized the new challenge posed by Waziristan, especially after offensives against Afghan and American forces have increased and intelligence confirmed the existence of a large number of foreign terrorists in the region. In response, it sought the cooperation of the Pakistanis with the hope that it could squeeze the enemy between its own special forces coming from the west and Pakistani security forces moving from the east. According to this strategy, Islamabad began in 2002 to build military bases in Waziristan for the first time, ending its traditional policy of not running large in the region. Actual clashes between security forces and local and foreign militants, however, began in 2003 and intensified in the following years with sporadic calmness. According to recent reports from Waziristan, the Pakistani army seems to be facing serious difficulties there, despite its well trained soldiers and more advanced guns. It is true that it has launched many successful campaigns that resulted in the destruction of several terrorist camps and the arrest or killing of hundreds of extremists. But it is also true that it has been confronted with tough resistance, including the killing, wounding, and kidnapping of hundreds of its troops. Moreover, terrorist militants and their Waziri supporters have managed to launch offensives across the Pakistan-Afghan border. This has resulted in a serious crisis between Islamabad and Kabul in the recent weeks, a development that Al-Qaeda and Taliban�s forces must be happy about. Difficulties faced by the Pakistani army in the region could be attributed to factors other than the rigid nature of the battlefield and the toughness of pro-Taliban Waziri tribesmen. There is no national consensus on the army�s role in Waziristan, despite President Pervez Musharraf�s repeated calls upon Pakistani people, parties and tribes to support his policy of ridding the countries of all foreign and local terrorist groups or face dire consequences from Washington�s wrath. On the other hand, the regime�s weak domestic position has prevented it from fully cooperating and coordinating with Washington and Kabul to properly squeeze Waziristan. This was clear earlier this year when US forces took alone an initiative to strike inside Pakistani areas. Islamabad was quick not only to deny its knowledge of or involvement in the operation but also to protest. Given the aforementioned factors, the current problem in Waziristan is not expected to end soon. It is rather expected to develop into a long and larger war with serious future implications for both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
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