Undermining Thai democracy
Published on April 03, 2006
The current intensifying political crisis in Thailand between the democratically-elected government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and opposition groups led by the Democratic Party can be viewed from different angles.
First, it is a reflection of the controversial phenomenon of successful businessmen entering politics. Like in the cases of Lebanon and Italy, where the late construction tycoon Rafik Hariri and media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi came to power respectively, the arrival of communication tycoon Thaksin to power in Thailand has divided people into two groups. One group has welcomed the development, viewing it as a result of traditional politicians� failure to efficiently lead the country in a world characterized by swift economic changes and tremendous development challenges. The other has perceived it as a threat to democracy, human rights, public morality, and the rule of law, given businessmen�s financial muscle that, presumably, can be used to buy votes, influence decision-making, or violate the law.
Thaksin, a former police officer, successfully managed to build his business empire before entering politics in the late 1990s at the helm of his Thai Rak Thai party. He carefully exploited two factors to rise to power in 2001: a vacuum created by the 1997 economic crisis which wrecked the Democratic Party, then Thailand�s most successful political party, and the new 1997 constitution which changed the electoral system in ways that favoured a business-based party. Since then, he has been the subject of various allegations, including corruption, abuse of power, promoting political allies to top governmental posts, and undermining media freedom and various checking and balancing institutions.
Second, the crisis is a reflection of the long-standing struggle between those who support the privatization of state-owned enterprises on the grounds that it would modernize and breathe new life into the country�s economy and those who oppose the idea on the plea that it might lead to the fall of important national assets in the hands of foreigners. Privatization has been one of Thaksin�s flagship policies, despite sharp criticism from opposition parties, leftists, and unionists. Recently, the Supreme Administrative Court has ruled on that his plans to float a 25% stake in the country�s electricity-generating monopoly was a case of conflict of interest, a decision that could put on hold Thaksin�s other privatization plans and open to legal challenge earlier state-enterprise share offerings orchestrated by his government. This was unlike a decision in February by the Constitution Court, which rejected a move by some senators for Thaksin�s impeachment on the grounds of his complicity in the sale of his family-owned Shin Corp to a Singaporean holding company. The sale, in which the Shinawatras reaped $ 1.9 billion, has been a motivation behind the emergence of the so-called people power movement aimed at dislodging Thaksin from government.
Third, the crisis can also be seen as a traditional struggle between the urban elite who control or run most public and private sectors and the rural poor who seek to have a voice.
Thaksin�s electoral base is in the remote rural areas, from where most of 18 million members of his party come. This is said to be attributed to his policy of shrinking the gap between the urban and rural economies through pushing more rural poor into business and improving their lives and education. The opposition, known for not trusting rural voters and denying them a voice, however, has described this as vote-buying policy.
Fourth, the crisis also represents a case in which opposition forces, instead of defeating the ruling party at the polls or through constitutional tools, have resorted to undemocratic means. Knowing they have no hope of contesting the April 2 snap parliamentary elections that Thaksin has called for in a bid to restore his popularity and mandate, the opposition parties have not only resorted to anti-government rallies and demonstrations but have also decided to boycott the elections. Moreover, they drew the monarchy into the current fray by accusing Thaksin of disloyalty to the throne and portraying themselves as defenders of the King. Such moves, of course, undermine the country�s still-evolving democracy.
With no willingness from either side to negotiate a settlement, and with division and tensions escalating in the society, attention is now turned towards Article 7 of the constitution, which allows the King to intervene during times of national crisis. King Bhumibol Adulyadej had intervened in the country�s bloody events of 1973, 1976, and 1992 caused by pro-democracy uprisings and military crackdowns. But it is unclear how badly the current situation would have to deteriorate before he felt it necessary to intervene, especially with both sides of the current crisis portraying themselves as champions of democracy.
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Dr. Abdulla Al-Madani is an Academic researcher and lecturer in Asian affairs.