|
|
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
||
|
|
||||
|
|
|
Iraqi election nears but no guarantee of sharing power offered to Sunnis
The election for Iraq�s parliament is slated for January 30, 2005, which is only two weeks from now and it is quite uncertain whether the election will be free of violence or whether the majority of the Sunnis will boycott the election. If a handful of Sunni candidates run from the �Sunni Triangle�, they may be elected but won�t share power with the dominant Shia parliamentarians. The Sunnis who were accustomed to be in power for decades because they controlled the ruling Baath Party now realizes that their heydays are gone and going forward they will remain as a minority power in Iraq. This baleful thought is causing concern among Sunni leaders and their followers. What are they going to do about it? Is there any formula through which they could share power with the dominant Shia politicians from the rest of the country? For some thoughts on this, please peruse the rest of this article. Bad news
travels fast. U.S. and Iraqi officials will not guarantee Iraq�s restive
Sunnis in the �Golden Triangle� a share of power when the future Iraqi
parliament convenes. This decision by U.S. and Iraqi officials threatens to
make matters worse in the �Sunni Triangle� as ethnic strife may intensify
only to mar the legitimacy of Iraq�s next elected government. Violence in
Iraq has already intensified weeks before the planned parliamentarian
election of January 30, 2005. A day earlier, gunmen killed a representative
of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most senior and revered Shiite
Muslim cleric, along with the aide�s son and four bodyguards in a town south
of Baghdad, which is inside the �Sunni Triangle�. This should be indicative
of who did the killing. The Sunni gunmen wanted to send a chilling message
to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Insurgents are
now desperate to foil Iraq�s upcoming elections. By assassinating the head
Shiite clergy�s aid and others from Shiite community appears to deliver a
message to al-Sistani, who strongly supports the election. Recently, we
also read that the Sunni insurgents have targeted electoral workers and
candidates. The insurgents want an absolute chaos in Iraq right before the
election. In a bid to draw attention from international news organizations
they carried out today (January 13, 2005) a kidnapping operation in central
Baghdad; in the process they killed six Iraqis while abducting a Turkish
businessman, who reportedly ran a construction company aiding the U.S.-led
occupation authorities. Why is it that
the Sunnis in �Golden Triangle� are so upset about the hosting of January 30
elections? The election math scares the hell out of them. You see, Shiites
make up 60 percent of Iraq's 26 million people and are expected to dominate
the 275-member National Assembly in the first free elections held in Iraq
since it became independent in 1932. As I have pointed it out earlier, some
Sunnis, who are 20 percent of the population, fear a loss of the dominance
and privilege they enjoyed for decades under Baathist regimes. Therefore,
it comes as no surprise that Sunni clerics have called for an all out
boycott. I read today in
the Wall Street Journal a pre-election analysis of the ground reality in
Iraq. According to the journal, an internal U.S. estimate indicates that
the Sunnis are likely to fare very poorly in the elections. With violence
escalating in the Sunni belt, many residents (read Sunnis) will opt not to
cast their votes because of anger at the U.S. An estimate by the U.S.
officials put the number of parliamentary seats to be won by the Sunnis at
6%, a figure well below 20%, which should be the correct figure if most
Sunnis go to the poll. The consequence
of such dismal showing in the next election by the Sunni politicians would
mean that the country�s Shiite majority who account for 60% of the
population would disproportionately dominate Iraq�s next government. The
decision by the Sunnis to remain absent from the election would give the
Shiites extra seats in the parliament. The U.S. and Iraqi officials ruled
out guaranteeing Sunni representation in the parliament. In other words,
there will be no quota system for any ethnic group. This policy will favor
the Shiites. It is a small wonder that Ali-al-Sistani is ecstatic about
this election and he is asking the authorities not to delay the election. Earlier, U.S.
and Iraqi authorities thought that Sunnis should be given a stake in Iraq�s
next government even if it means handing them a few extra parliamentary
seats. However, this idea of guaranteeing Sunni representation in the
parliament was ruled out because such move would run counter to the idea of
forming the next government through democracy. Besides, this would violate
Iraq�s temporary constitution. The decision of
not guaranteeing Sunni representation came amidst �an array of problems
threatening the planned balloting of for a 275-person national assembly
charged with governing the country while drafting a permanent constitution,�
as the WSJ reporter wrote in his article. Iraq�s Sunnis
know it fully well that in any election that is based on �one-person one
vote,� they cannot have majority in the parliament. Thus, Sunni militants
took to the street from early 2004. The Sunni-led violence has escalated so
much so that interim Iraqi Prime minister, Ayad Allawi, had said in early
January 2005 that several predominantly Sunni areas of the country would be
too dangerous for Iraqis to cast their ballots on January 30 election. The
Sunni clerics also realized that by now, Ali al-Sistani�s followers would be
in the catbird seat of power in Baghdad. Thus, they also gave their clarion
call for boycotting the January 30 election. On top of it, Iraq�s largest
Sunni political party has decided to pull out of the race. Since the Sunnis
of Iraq saw the proverbial writings on the wall, they decided to be no part
of this election. Nonetheless, U.S. and interim Iraqi government have
decided to conduct this election rain or shine. Under this dire
backdrop (for Sunnis), many Sunnis including two politicians have demanded
that the election be delayed for a minimum of six months to improve the law
and order situation in the Sunni belt. This extra time will allow the Sunni
leaders to persuade their people to participate in the voting process.
Several members of Mr. Allawi�s government and some Kurdish leaders echoed
this sentiment. However, Shiites clergies including the grand Ayatollah of
Iraq want the election to go through on January 30, 2005. The Bush
Administration also wants to see the election held on the scheduled date for
it said that delaying the vote would hand a victory to the Sunni insurgents;
this delay would trigger more violence. The issue of
how to deal with Iraq�s Sunni minority is one of the thorniest and
complicated issues faced by U.S. and Iraqi policymakers. In the last four
decades, the minority Sunni leaders controlled every aspect of Iraqi life.
Saddam Hussein along with many Baath party leaders had monopolized all
economical and political power in Iraq. Saddam�s army had officers from
Sunni sect while the foot soldiers were recruited from Shia communities.
The Sunnis from �Golden Triangle� had the arrogance of being the masters and
they are dreading about becoming powerless under the Shiite dominated
government. The Sunnis have
been hesitant to join the election process for they fear that their newfound
minority status will be formalized and it will remain so as long as the
Shiites could form the government year after year. The U.S. planners have
no idea how to work out a formula to remove the genuine apprehension that is
in the minds of Sunni folks. This inability by the U.S. administration to
work a plan to include Sunnis in the power structure is causing a concern
amongst not only Sunni intellectuals but also U.S. experts on Iraq. Mr.
Larry Diamond of Stanford University�s Hoover Institution who served in the
U.S. occupation authority in 2004 said, �The ongoing exclusion of Sunnis
from the decision-making process in Iraq will further polarize and inflame
the situation, increase their sense of marginalization, and potentially
grease the slide towards civil war. It is one thing to tell Sunnis they
won�t rule the country anymore, but it is another to say they won�t even
have a seat at the table.� A handful of
Sunni politicians will win in the election. These Sunni politicians have
aligned with political parties controlled by Shiite politicians. If all
Sunnis would have voted from the �Golden Triangle�, they would secure 55
seats but under this dismal scenario of boycott by the Sunnis, they might
capture only 15 to 30 seats. U.S. expects the Shiite run government would
offer important cabinet positions to Sunnis and allow them to join the
committee that will draft the future constitution. The other possibility
would be appointing ministers from Sunni communities even they have not been
elected to the national assembly. In short, everyone wants to see more
participation by the Sunni politicians at the national level. However, the
ground reality will put a roadblock to it. Under this scenario, more
violence will erupt in Iraq in post election days and country may head for a
protracted civil war. In summary, the
much talked about national election in Iraq is only two weeks away but the
Sunnis have no guarantee of sharing power at the center. U.S. and interim
Iraqi government have not come up with the idea to reserve seats for the
Sunnis in the parliament fearing that doing so would violate the democratic
process. The Sunnis are expected to win only 15-30 seats out of 275
parliamentary seats. That is precisely the reason many Sunnis would boycott
the election. The Shiites on the other hand would like to see that the
election is held on January 30, 2005. After years of subjugation by the
minority sect, this is the first opportunity Shiites would have to govern
the nation. It is a small wonder that the grand Ayatollah of Iraq, Ali-al-Sistani,
warned the U.S. not to delay the election. It remains to be seen whether
the insurgency-led civil war intensifies after the election in the event
majority of the Sunnis abstain from casting their ballots. Therefore, stay
tuned because more is yet to come. ------------------------------- Dr. A.H. Jaffor Ullah, a
researcher and columnist, writes from New Orleans, USA
|
|
|
 |
|
 |
||
|
||||
